CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION CONSTRUED TO LIMIT SCOPE OF DWI ROADBLOCKS-State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271
(App. Div. 1985).
The use of automobiles as an efficient and economical means
of transportation has become an integral part of American life in
the twentieth century.' Providing people with a mobility and a
convenience never before realized, the automobile is now the
most popular means of transportation in this country. 2 This
growth in the use of the automobile has not occurred without its
concomitant problems, however.' One problem of major concern
to the government and the American public is the growing phenomenon of driving while intoxicated (DWI).4 Every year,
thousands of people are needlessly injured or killed in automobile accidents caused by drunken drivers. 5
Although the government has outlawed DWI 6 and passed
other laws to ensure traffic safety, 7 efforts to enforce these laws
through sobriety checkpoints and roadblocks have received a
great deal of constitutional scrutiny.' The debate concerning
I See Westendorf & Westendorf, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to Sobriety
Checkpoints?, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 127, 127 (1984) (noting that "[e]very day the vast
majority of Americans use our nation's highways either as passengers or drivers of
automobiles").
2 See id. The authors recognize that the automobile provides "[an] economical
means of transportation, [which] has allowed us to become the most mobile society
in history[.]" Id.
3 See id.
4 See Driving Drunks Off the Road, CHANGING TIMES, July 1982, at 50 (noting pub-

lic concern for the problem of drunken driving); Case Note, The FourthAmendment
Roadblock Against Detecting Drunk Drivers: Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 18 SuFFOLK U.L. REV. 475, 475 (1984) (noting government concern for the problem of
drunken driving).
5 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
TASK FORCE IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND

COMMUNITY ALCOHOL HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAMS 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
GUIDELINES] (stating that "[r]esearch indicates that more than 250,000 Americans

have died in alcohol-related traffic crashes during the last decade").
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West Cum. Supp. 1985-1986).
7 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:3-43 to -79.8 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 19851986) (regulations pertaining to automobile equipment violations); Id. §§ 39:4-95
to -104 (regulations concerning vehicle speed violations).
8 See Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the FourthAmendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1460 (1983) (stating that "although some
jurisdictions have accepted the use of some types of roadblocks, the constitutionality of roadblock stops for DWI enforcement remains unclear"). The several states
are by no means in accord regarding the constitutionality of roadblock stops and
seizures. Compare State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D. 1976) (holding that
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these methods of inspection focuses on the judicial tug-of-war
between effective enforcement of the laws and the right of private
citizens to be free from unreasonable searches. 9 Recently, a New
Jersey appellate court examined the constitutionality of vehicular
checkpoints.' 0 In State v. Kirk," the appellate division set forth
specific criteria upon which the constitutional
validity of station2
ary roadblocks would be upheld.'
At approximately 5:25 p.m. on October 15, 1983, Troopers
Mayes and Martinez of the New Jersey State Police established a
roadblock on Route 550 in Cape May County. 13 The decision to
establish the checkpoint was the product of an informal discussion between the two troopers. 14 The purpose of the roadblock
was to stop all vehicles traveling in both directions and check
drivers' licenses, automobile registrations, and insurance cards
while concurrently inspecting for equipment violations and signs
of driver intoxication.' 5 The troopers selected Route 550 because it was a two-lane, lightly-traveled road; consequently, no
substantial traffic congestion would be created as a result of the
checkpoint. 16 Upon agreeing to conduct the roadblock, Trooper
DWI roadblocks are unconstitutional "unless authorized by prior judicial warrant")
with State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980) (holding that a constitutional roadblock may be based solely upon "a predetermination by policy-making
administrative officers").
9 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); State v. Hilleshiem,
291 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa 1980); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass.
137, 141, 449 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1983); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 582,
427 A.2d 131, 134 (Law Div. 1980); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394 (S.D.
1976).
10 See State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985).
11 202 NJ. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985).
12 See id. at 37, 493 A.2d at 1275.
13 Brief and Appendix on Behalf of the Attorney General, Amicus Curiae at 2,
State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985) [hereinafter cited
as Attorney General's Brief].
14 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 33-34, 493 A.2d at 1273. When asked how he determined to initiate the roadblock, Trooper Mayes replied, "Basically [Trooper Martinez and I] just discuss it and we'll have one." Id.
15 Attorney General's Brief, supra note 13, at 2 n.1. Trooper Mayes provided the
following description of the purpose and procedure of this checkpoint:
[W]hat we do is we set up at that time it was only two troopers, me and
another trooper, we take both lanes north and south bound in this instance and stop every car that comes down the road asking for driver's
license, registration, insurance card and at this time we also check for
any equipment violation such as balled (sic) tires and such, anybody who
is-appears to be intoxicated and any drugs, anything in plain view of
such sort.
Id. (citation omitted).
16 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 32-33, 493 A.2d at 1273.
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Mayes stopped his car on one side of the highway and positioned
himself in the center of the road.17 Trooper Martinez parked his
car and stationed himself on the opposite side of the highway.' 8
The officers did not use flares or warning signs at the checkpoint,
and they provided no other advance notice to oncoming
motorists. 19

Approximately ten minutes after the traffic check was initiated, Trooper Mayes stopped the first approaching vehicle,
which was driven by Francis Kirk.20 Pursuant to the officer's instruction, Kirk pulled his car to the side of the road, where he was
questioned. 2 ' During this interrogation, Mayes perceived Kirk to
be intoxicated and ordered him to perform roadside sobriety
tests. 2 2 Based on his observations, Mayes arrested Kirk under a

suspicion of drunken driving. 23 Immediately thereafter, the officers discontinued the roadblock and took Kirk to the police barracks for booking. 24 During the entire administration of the
checkpoint, the officers stopped only one other automobile.25
Kirk was later charged with driving while intoxicated.2 6
Kirk filed a motion for suppression of the evidence procured
as a result of the traffic check. 27 He alleged that the stop lacked
"probable cause or particularized suspicion of illegal activity"
and thus violated his constitutional rights. 28 The trial court denied Kirk's motion to suppress, and Kirk pled guilty to operating
an automobile while intoxicated. 29 Notwithstanding his guilty
plea, Kirk sought appellate review of the constitutionality of the
checkpoint established by Mayes and Martinez. 0 Subsequently,
3
the appellate division reversed the order denying suppression '
and held that a temporary roadblock, initiated through "the exercise of absolute, unbridled discretion of.

.

. officers in the field"

violated the New Jersey Constitution's provision prohibiting un17 Attorney General's Brief, supra note 13, at 3.
18 Id.

19 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 34, 493 A.2d at 1273.

20 Id. at 33, 493 A.2d at 1273.

21 See Attorney General's Brief, supra note 13, at 3.
22 Id. at 4.
23 Id.
24 Kirk, 202 NJ. Super. at 33, 493 A.2d at 1273.
25 Id.

26 See id.

27 Attorney General's Brief, supra note 13, at 4.
28 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 32, 493 A.2d at 1272.
29 Id.
30 Id., 493 A.2d at 1273.
31 Id. at 58, 493 A.2d at 1288.
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reasonable seizures.32 The court recognized, however, that roadblocks established pursuant to predetermined administrative
guidelines would be constitutionally permissible, provided that
the guidelines ensured sufficient, nondiscretionary supervisory
control over officers in the field.33
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
specifically prohibits the government from subjecting individuals
to unreasonable searches and seizures.34 Article I, paragraph 7 of
the New Jersey Constitution sets forth a parallel prohibition of
unreasonable government searches and seizures.35 The purpose
of these provisions is to protect the privacy of individuals against
random invasions by governmental authorities. 36 It is well-settled

in Federal and New Jersey jurisprudence that these constitutional
restrictions apply to police stops and searches of automobiles.3 7
In interpreting these provisions, however, courts have had a difficult time determining what specific circumstances will justify the
stop of an automobile as "reasonable. ' '38 Faced with this quandary, courts analyzing the reasonableness of automobile stops
have generally resolved the issue by balancing the importance of
the public interest to be preserved against the pervasiveness of
the privacy intrusion.39 Under this approach, if the public interest
involved outweighs the government's infringement on the mo32 Id. at 37, 493 A.2d at 1275. The court was careful to state, "We wish to be
clear that our decision is rendered on State constitutional grounds exclusively, not
on federal constitutional grounds." Id. at 34, 493 A.2d at 1274; see infra notes 94-95
and accompanying text.
33 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 55-56, 493 A.2d at 1286-87.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
35 N.J. CONST. art. I,
7.
36 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)); see also Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 35-36, 493
A.2d at 1274-75 (outlining fundamental purpose of art. I,
7 of the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947).
37 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.
Super. 575, 584, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (Law Div. 1980).
38 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979); State v. Alston, 88
N.J. 211, 230-32, 440 A.2d 1311, 1321-22 (1981); State v. Carpentieri, 82 N.J. 546,
548, 414 A.2d 966, 967 (1980).
39 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J. Super. 575, 582, 427 A.2d 131, 134 (Law Div. 1980).
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torist's privacy, then the search is reasonable and constitutional. 41 If, on the other hand, the government's intrusion on the
motorist's right to privacy outweighs the public interest involved,
then the search is unreasonable and cannot be upheld.41
In the last ten years, a distinct line of United States Supreme
Court cases has provided the groundwork for Federal and state
decisions concerning the reasonableness of automobile stops by
the police.4 2 The Supreme Court initially addressed the fourth
amendment implications of vehicle stops and motorist detentions
in cases involving immigration control.4 3 In United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce,4 4 two border patrol officers in a parked patrol car
observed Brignoni-Ponce's vehicle traveling northbound on the
main highway between Mexico and Southern California.4 5 The
officers pursued and stopped the vehicle based on their observation that "[the] three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent." 4 6 Questioning revealed that the passengers had entered
the United States illegally, and the officers arrested BrignoniPonce and charged him with two counts of transporting illegal
aliens. 4 7 At trial, the defendant was convicted of carrying illegal
immigrants into the country.4 8 Brignoni-Ponce subsequently appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit.4 9
On appeal, the central issue was the difference between a
40 State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 583-84, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (Law Div.
1980); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (noting the
difficulty courts traditionally have had in determining what constitutes an "unreasonable" search and seizure). The Camara court stated:
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for
many years divided the members of [the Supreme] Court.
Id.
41 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979).
42 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
44 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
45 Id. at 874-75.
46 Id. at 875.
47 Id. Knowingly transporting illegal aliens into this country is a violation of
Federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (1982).
48 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875.
49 See id.
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fixed checkpoint and a roving patrol stop.5" Classifying the stop
of Brignoni-Ponce's car as one made by a roving patrol," the
court noted that the fourth amendment prohibits the use of such
patrols to search vehicles without a warrant or probable cause.52
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the detention of a vehicle for the sole purpose of interrogating its occupants, without a
"founded suspicion" of illegal activity, is violative of the fourth
amendment.53 The court declined to hold that Mexican ancestry
alone constituted a "founded suspicion" sufficient to sustain the
stop of Brignoni-Ponce's vehicle.54
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's determination.55 Initially, the Court
recognized that the fourth amendment applies to all seizures of
persons, including brief detentions such as that of BrignoniPonce.56 The opinion noted that the key to a seizure's legality for
the purposes of the fourth amendment is the reasonableness of
the police action under the circumstances. The Court further
observed that "the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law of' In this instance, the Court believed that the stop of the
ficers." 58
defendant's automobile, based solely on the Mexican appearance
of its occupants, was too arbitrary to be condoned.5 9 Nevertheless, because of the Government's interest in curbing the flow of
illegal aliens, the Court admonished that future stops based on
less than probable cause may be permitted if conducted in a less
50

Id. at 875 n.1.

51 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1974), af'd,

422 U.S. 873 (1975).
52 See id. at 1110-11. The Ninth Circuit compared this case with the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless police seizure
of an automobile within 20 miles of the Mexican border violated the fourth amendment. See id. at 273-75. Relying upon Almeida-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit invalidated
the police search of Brignoni-Ponce's automobile and stated that this type of search
was "entirely inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Almeida-Sanchez."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1974), affd, 422
U.S. 873 (1975).
53 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1974),
affd, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
54 Id.
55 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 876, 887.
56 Id. at 878.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 885-86.
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arbitrary fashion than this one. 6 ' The court was also careful to
note in its opinion that "[t]he only issue presented for decision [in
this case] is whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an area
near the border and question its occupants when the only groundfor
suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry."6 1

One year after its decision in Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of border patrol stops and
searches at permanent motorist checkpoints.6 2 In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,63 the Court held that a brief investigatory stop of
a vehicle at a fixed border checkpoint could be made without
64
probable cause or any articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

The Court noted that a roadblock-type stop involves the same
degree of "objective intrusion" as is occasioned in a roving patrol stop. 65 Nevertheless, the Court distinguished these checkpoint investigatory stops from the random detention in BrignoniPonce, reasoning that the permanent location of checkpoints
reduces the subjective intrusiveness of the seizure. 66 Further, the
Court stated that the selection of the checkpoint site by administrative officials eliminates any discretionary actions by field officers that might contribute to unreasonable seizures.6 7 These
60 See id. at 884. More specifically, the Brignoni-Ponce Court stated that "officers
on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id. The
Court outlined several factors that might be considered in determining whether
there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify a brief investigatory
stop. See id. at 884-85. These factors included "[the vehicle's] proximity to the
border, the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience
with alien traffic." Id. The Court also noted that "information about recent illegal
border crossings in the area" and a particular driver's actions and mannerisms
could be relevant. Id. (citations omitted). The Court stressed that reliance on
merely one factor would not justify an investigatory stop. Id. at 885-86.
61 Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
62 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
63 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
64 See id. at 566-67.
65 Id. at 557-58. The Martinez-Fuerte Court explained that the "objective intrusion" experienced at a roadblock-type stop includes "the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection." Id. at 558.
66 Id. at 558-59. The Court described subjective intrusion as "the generating of
concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers." Id. at 558. The Court also
listed many features of the permanent immigration checkpoint that lessen the subjective intrusiveness of the stop. Id. at 545-46. These included road signs providing
advance warning of the impending stop, the presence of uniformed border patrol
officers and border patrol vehicles equipped with flashing lights, a permanent structure housing a border patrol office, and flood lights for use at night. Id.
67 Id. at 559. Although field officers at a permanent immigration checkpoint
may stop only vehicles passing the checkpoint, they still have some discretion to
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distinctions, along with the compelling governmental interest in
eliminating the surge of illegal aliens into the United States,
tipped the fourth amendment balancing scale in favor of the
checkpoint searches.68 As a result, the Court's decision obviated
the constitutional need for any type of69criminal suspicion in order to uphold a seizure as reasonable.
In Martinez-Fuerte, as in Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court

evaluated only the use of traffic stops and roadblocks as they relate to immigration control. The Court specifically reserved the
question concerning the constitutionality of similar police techniques when used for the enforcement of routine traffic safety
regulations. 70 The most significant Supreme Court decision addressing this issue was Delaware v. Prouse.7 ' In Prouse, a patrolman

randomly stopped a vehicle in order to inspect the operator's license and registration.7 2 The patrolman acknowledged that he
had neither probable cause to stop the vehicle nor a reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity. 73 The United States Supreme Court

subsequently held that this initial stop was proscribed by the
fourth amendment.7 ' Relying on Martinez-Fuerte,the Court recogchoose which vehicles to investigate. See id. at 560, 563 (selective referral of some
vehicles to secondary inspection area for limited inquiry into residence status
deemed reasonable without particularized reason for referral). The Court indicated that suspicion of Mexican ancestry was a valid justification for such selective
referrals. Id. at 563.
68 See id. at 562.
69 The Court acknowledged that state law enforcement agencies lacking any articulable suspicion of illegal activity often conducted random stops "to enforce laws
regarding drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar matters."
Id. at 560 n. 14. The Court, however, reserved the question of the constitutionality
of such stops. Id.
70 Id.; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-57 n.13 (1979) (noting that
previous Supreme Court decisions involving border patrol stops failed to affect
"the permissibility of state and local officials stopping motorists for document
questioning"); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n.3 (1975) (probable cause
requirement for vehicle searches may not apply to routine safety inspections);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975) (holding does not
deprive state and local officials of power to conduct limited stops necessary to enforce licensing, registration, and truck weight regulations).
71 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
72 Id. at 650.
73 See id. at 650-51. The patrolman stated, "I saw the car in the area and wasn't
answering any complaints, so I decided to pull them off." Id.
74 Id. at 663. Striking down this random traffic stop as unconstitutional, the
Court stated:
[W]e hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that
an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant
is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automo-
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nized the distinction between individualized random stops and
permanent roadblocks, and noted the greater degree of subjective intrusion occasioned by the use of random stops.7 5 Although
it perceived the compelling state interest in promoting traffic
safety, the Court refused to expose motorists to "unfettered governmental intrusion[s] every time [they] entered an automobile."'7 6 Moreover,

the Court

recognized

that there were

alternative, more acceptable means through which to assure
highway safety.7 7 Specifically, the Prouse Court stated that "[t]his
holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States
from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops
is one possible alternative. "78
While Prouse and the earlier immigration control cases provide the analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of traffic stops and roadblocks, these decisions do not
conclusively approve or disapprove of the use of temporary DWI
checkpoints. 79 The ambiguity of Supreme Court decisions deal-

ing with this issue has resulted in conflicting Federal and state
court roadblock decisions.8 0 The depth of analysis and decisive
bile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and
the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
Id.
75 Id. at 656-57.
76

Id. at 662-63.

77 See id. at 663 & n.26.

Id. at 663 (footnote omitted).
See Note, supra note 8, at 1470 (noting the "[c]onfusion in the [w]ake of
Prouse" with regard to the constitutionality of different types of roadblocks and traffic stops).
80 See State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1134-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The
McLaughlin court surveyed various decisions involving fourth amendment challenges to evidence seized at police roadblocks where the primary or secondary purpose of the roadblock was to check for DWI violations. Id. Prior to McLaughlin, five
decisions had approved the use of the DWI roadblock. See State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Law Div.
1980); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984);
People v. Peil, 122 Misc. 2d 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532 (J. Ct. 1984). Five other states'
decisions had deemed the roadblock in question impermissible under the fourth
amendment. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992
(1983); People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Smith, 674
P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).
Another noteworthy case that qualified the constitutionality of roadblocks was
United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981). In Prichard, two New
78
79
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factors in these cases varies greatly. Some courts, relying only on
the Supreme Court's dicta in Prouse,8 ' have approved certain
roadblocks simply because all motorists who approached the
checkpoint in question were stopped.8 2 Other courts have placed
a great deal of emphasis on the presence or absence of guidelines
set by superior officers to control the discretion of the field officers actually conducting the roadblock.8 3 In addition, two courts
have invalidated roadblocks because the prosecution failed to
show that the roadblock method was more effective than traditional methods of enforcing drunken driving laws.8 4
Prouse also precipitated a radical change in existing New
Jersey law.8 5 Before the Prouse decision, individualized random
stops were specifically allowed by the New Jersey judiciary.8 6 One
Mexico state troopers initiated a roadblock on an interstate highway in order to
inspect motorists' vehicle registrations and drivers' licenses. Id. at 855. The officers
received permission to establish the roadblock from a law enforcement supervisor,
but the specific details concerning the operation of the checkpoint were not clearly
set forth. Id. Consequently, not all vehicles that approached the roadblock were
stopped. Id. The officers chose not to stop "semi-trucks" because they had already
been checked at a point of entry. Id. Furthermore, some vehicles were arbitrarily
waved through the roadblock when traffic became congested. Id. The defendant
Prichard was driving one of the cars that was stopped at the roadblock. Id. The
officers subsequently smelled a strong odor coming from the vehicle, and they obtained consent to search the automobile. Id. at 856. In the cargo area, the officers
discovered a large amount of cocaine, and they arrested Prichard for possession
with the intent to distribute. Id. Prichard subsequently sought judicial review of the
roadblock, alleging that it was constitutionally infirm. Id.
The trial court denied Prichard's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a
result of the search. Id. at 855. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that the roadblock's validity was governed by the dicta in Prouse allowing for traffic checking
techniques that are less discretionary or less intrusive than random spot checks. Id.
at 856. The court held that the failure to stop trucks and the waving through of
vehicles to prevent traffic congestion were reasonable variances from the complete
roadblock envisioned in Prouse. Id. at 856-57. Therefore, the court concluded that
the roadblock satisfied the limited discretion rule of Prouse and was, in fact, constitutional. Id.
81 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
The Kinslow court stated that "[t]he key [to this roadblock's validity] is the fact that
all vehicles were stopped." Id.
83 See, e.g., State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980); State v. 01gaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394-95 (S.D. 1976).
84 See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996
(1983); People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 578, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1984); see
also West, N.H. Court Holds Roadblocks Unconstitutional,Nat'l L.J., Sept. 9, 1985, at 8,
col. 1 (New Hampshire Supreme Court first to declare unconditionally that all
roadblocks are unconstitutional because they are not the most effective means of
apprehending drunken drivers).
85 State v. Carpentieri, 82 N.J. 546, 548, 414 A.2d 966, 967 (1980).
86 Id.; see State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 567, 285 A.2d 1, 3 (1971); State v. Braxton,
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year after the Supreme Court's decision in Prouse, however, a
New Jersey court examined the validity of DWI roadblocks in
State v. Coccomo.8 v In Coccomo, the defendant was arrested at a
roadblock initiated by local police. 88 The particular roadblock
had been authorized through a written policy statement issued by
the chief of police, which mandated the stop of every fifth vehicle
passing a given point. 9 The Coccomo court recognized the importance of removing drunk drivers from the highways in the interest of traffic safety.9" Empirical data demonstrated that a drunken
driving problem existed in the vicinity of the Coccomo roadblock,
thereby creating a substantial traffic safety hazard. 9 ' Noting the
increase in arrests since the institution of the checkpoint, the
court upheld the DWI roadblock as a "productive mechanism"
for the apprehension of motorists violating the drunken driving
laws 92

Based upon this foundation ofjudicial precedent, the appellate division first addressed the constitutional ramifications of a
sobriety roadblock in State v. Kirk. 9 3 The Kirk court began its analysis by stating that its decision would be rendered on New Jersey
constitutional grounds exclusively rather than on Federal constitutional grounds.9 4 Article I, paragraph 7 of the NewJersey Constitution of 1947, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
by the government, is remarkably similar in wording to the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 95 The court
reasoned, however, that in several recent New Jersey decisions,
the New Jersey Constitution has been interpreted to safeguard a
57 N.J. 286, 287, 271 A.2d 713, 713 (1970); State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J. Super. 85,
88, 236 A.2d 164, 166 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 52 N.J. 507, 246 A.2d 714 (1968).
87 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Law Div. 1980).
88 Id. at 580, 427 A.2d at 133. The roadblock was in operation in Roxbury, New
Jersey on April 5, 1980. Id. at 579, 427 A.2d at 133. It was set up by the police on a
road frequented by patrons of local taverns. Id. at 582, 427 A.2d at 134. The defendant was stopped at approximately 2:55 a.m. Id. at 580, 427 A.2d at 133.
89 Id. at 579 & n.1, 427 A.2d at 133 & n.1. The Morris County Prosecutor had
promoted the roadblock procedures and had forwarded a summary of Prouse and a
set of roadblock regulations authorized by the Attorney General of New Jersey to
all NewJersey police chiefs. Id. at 579 n. 1, 427 A.2d at 133 n. 1. The Roxbury Chief
of Police sent a memorandum directing that the officers follow the procedures approved by the Attorney General when setting up the roadblock. Id.
90 Id. at 582 n.9, 427 A.2d at 134 n.9.
91 Id. at 582, 427 A.2d at 134.
92 Id., 427 A.2d at 134-35.
93 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (App. Div. 1985). The court stated, "This
case is one of first appellate impression in NewJersey." Id. at 36, 493 A.2d at 1275.
94 Id. at 34, 493 A.2d at 1274.
95 Compare N.J. CONST. art. I,
7 with U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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wider range of privacy interests than the parallel provision in the
Federal Constitution. 96 The appellate division concluded, therefore, that the state constitution "is a more appropriate vehicle to
resolve questions concerning the rights of our citizens to travel
97
[on New Jersey's] highways . . .without police interdiction.
The Kirk court next addressed the constitutionality of the
roadblock that led to the defendant's arrest and conviction for
drunken driving.98 The court opined that the roadblock in Kirk
"[was] really not distinguishable from the random investigatory
stop condemned in Prouse."99 The court further noted that "[t]his
temporary road block was set up by the exercise of absolute, unbridled discretion of the officers in the field[,] [t]here was no
command or supervisory participation involved[,] [and] [t]here
were no procedural limits or directions [for conducting the
checkpoint]."' 0 Finally, the court found no showing of the need
for or efficacy of the roadblock at the time and place chosen.' °
Consequently, the Kirk court concluded that these factors evidenced an excess level of discretion in the field officers,
which
0 2
proved fatal to the constitutionality of the roadblock.1
The Kirk court supported its holding with a lengthy discussion of pertinent United States Supreme Court decisions.'0 3
Foremost, the court examined the judicial interpretation of the
fourth amendment set forth in Prouse.10 4 The Prouse opinion recognized that the fourth amendment's primary purpose is to protect the privacy and security of individuals by requiring that all
law enforcement activities conform to a standard of reasonableness.' 5 Mindful of this precept, the Kirk court re-emphasized
that "standardless and unconstrainted [sic] discretion" of officers
96 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 35, 493 A.2d at 1274; see, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J.
338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311 (1981); State
v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super.
229, 491 A.2d 37 (App. Div. 1985).
97 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 36, 493 A.2d at 1275.
98 Id. at 36-37, 493 A.2d at 1275.
99 Id. at 37, 493 A.2d at 1275.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 36-37, 493 A.2d at 1275.
103 See id. at 37-40, 493 A.2d at 1275-77.
104 See id. at 37-39, 493 A.2d at 1275-77.
105 Id. at 38, 493 A.2d at 1276 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654); see supra notes 7477 and accompanying text. The Kirk court also engaged in a lengthy analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See Kirk, 202 NJ.
Super. at 39-40, 493 A.2d at 1277. Although the Brown case involved police detention of a pedestrian, the Kirk court recognized that Brown "reaffirmed the principles
• . .expressed [in Prouse]." Id. at 39, 493 A.2d at 1277.
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in the field was the "evil" that led other courts to invalidate automobile searches and seizures as unreasonable. 10 6 Consequently,
the court concluded that motorists on public roadways must not
be subjected to traffic stops conducted through "the unbridled discretion of police officers." 107
The Kirk court next traced several state and Federal court
decisions addressing the constitutionality of roadblocks."0 8 In
particular, the court focused on decisions reviewing roadblocks
designed to combat drunken driving.' 0 9 The court observed that
an examination of these cases revealed that certain elements are
important to most courts in resolving whether a particular roadblock will be approved or disapproved." 0 Summarizing these elements, the court maintained that a roadblock will probably
satisfy a constitutional challenge if the state demonstrates the following factors: the roadblock was set up and conducted pursuant
to supervisory authority; the roadblock was discretely aimed at a
particular area at a specific place and time; the site selection was
justified by empirical data showing that public safety needs warranted the checkpoint; and the roadblock was established to carry
out reasonably important law enforcement goals."' The court
recognized that absent these four factors, roadblocks set up by
officers in the field have failed to survive constitutional
scrutiny.' 12
Another issue considered by the Kirk court was the necessity
of the DWI roadblock as opposed to conventional, arguably less
Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 39, 493 A.2d at 1276.
Id., 493 A.2d at 1277 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663).
108 See id. at 40-42, 493 A.2d at 1277-78. Before addressing the constitutionality
of the Kirk roadblock, the court noted several cases in which a fourth amendment
challenge was made to the use of a particular roadblock. See id. at 41-42, 45-52, 493
A.2d at 1277, 1280-86 (citations omitted).
109 Id. at 40, 493 A.2d at 1277.
110 Id. at 40-41, 493 A.2d at 1277.
I 11 Id. The Kirk court further stated that "[o]ther factors which enhanced judicial
approval [of roadblocks] were (1) adequate warnings to avoid frightening the traveling public, (2) advance general publicity designed to deter drunken drivers from
getting in cars in the first place, and (3) officially specified neutral and courteous
procedures for the intercepting officers to follow when stopping drivers." Id. at 41,
493 A.2d at 1277.
112 Id., 493 A.2d at 1277-78. The court emphasized the participation of supervisory officials as a prerequisite for a roadblock's constitutionality. Id. at 41-42, 493
A.2d at 1278 (citing Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at 583, 427 A.2d at 134-35). Recognizing that Coccomo was "NewJersey's sole opinion on the subject [of roadblocks],"
the Kirk court was strongly persuaded by Coccomo's accent on the need for supervisory control of police-conducted checkpoints. Id.
106
107
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intrusive, means of law enforcement. 1 3 In this part of its analysis,
the court placed particular stress on a work by Professor Wayne
R. LaFave examining sobriety checkpoints. 1 4 Initially, the court
noted that abolishing drunken driving is clearly in the public interest." 5 The court recognized, however, that routine patrols
and other conventional police methods for combating drunken
driving have provided only limited success." 6 In addition, the
court stated that such conventional methods of enforcement focus primarily on the apprehension of the drunken driver, but do
not function to deter motorists who might be tempted to drive
while intoxicated.'
On the other hand, motorist checkpoints
provide successful apprehensions of drunken drivers as well as a
substantial deterrent effect through the public's awareness of
roadblocks." 8 The Kirk court reasoned, therefore, that the governmental and public interest promoted by the use of sobriety
roadblocks outweighed the minimal intrusion upon the individual's constitutionally protected rights." 9
The court next rejected the idea that sobriety checkpoints
must be permanent to be constitutional. 12 Rather, it noted that
temporary or movable roadblocks are constitutionally permissible provided that the discretion of field officers is sufficiently limited. 12 1 The court thus reiterated the concept that a preestablished " 'plan formulated or approved by executive-level officers' " is essential to judicial approval of a particular roadblock.' 2 2 Further justifying its belief that roadblocks can be
temporary, the court noted that police may establish a checkpoint
without obtaining a judicial warrant. 12 3 Consequently, the court
stated that the crucial consideration regarding a roadblock's constitutionality is "the validity of the decision as to when and where
113 See id. at 42-44, 493 A.2d at 1278-79.
114 Id. at 42-44, 493 A.2d at 1278-79. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 10.8(g) (Supp. 1985).
' 15 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 43, 493 A.2d at 1279; see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 114,

§ 10.8(g), at 190-92.
116 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 43, 493 A.2d at 1279.
117 Id.; see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 10. 8 (g), at 193.
118 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 43, 493 A.2d at 1279.
119 Id.; see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 10.8(g), at 190.
120 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 44, 493 A.2d at 1279; see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 114,
§ 10.8(g), at 194.
121 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 44, 493 A.2d at 1279; see also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 114, § 10.8(g), at 194.
122 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 44, 493 A.2d at 1280 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note
114, § 10. 8 (g), at 194 (citations omitted)).
123 Id.; see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 10.8(g), at 195.
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24

The Kirk court recognized that in the years subsequent to
Prouse, the fourth amendment considerations in traditional
seizure cases have undergone some clarification. 125 Specifically,
the court noted that numerous United States Supreme Court and
state court cases have examined-and often approved-seizures
similar to that at issue in Kirk. 126 Comparing these recent cases
with the case before it,' 27 the Kirk court nevertheless remained
28
convinced that this roadblock lacked constitutional validity.
The court supported its opinion by observing that the Kirk roadblock lacked minimum constitutional safeguards. 29 Specifically,
the court emphasized that the Kirk roadblock was devoid of even
"a modicum of supervisory participation" and without rational
justification for the location selected. 30 The court stated that the
only justification for the site selected was that it was not a welltraveled highway; hence, the roadblock would not cause substantial traffic congestion. 13 ' The Kirk court was unconvinced that
this consideration alone supported the constitutionality of the
checkpoint in question. 32 The court opined that without further
constitutional safeguards, it would be unable to discern if the
roadblock was a reasonable effort at law enforcement or merely a
124 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 44, 493 A.2d at 1280 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note
114, § 10. 8 (g), at 195).
125 Id. at 45, 493 A.2d at 1280; see also State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125,
1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the "refinements" in fourth amendment analysis
since Prouse).
126 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 45, 493 A.2d at 1280.
127 Id. at 45-55, 493 A.2d at 1280-86. The cases cited by the court included:
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (police search of pedestrian must be reasonable); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984) (approval of
roadblock established pursuant to command directives); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (discretionary roadblocks impermissible); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating
sobriety roadblock because of lack of supervisory control); State v. McLaughlin,
471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding roadblock unconstitutional because
not shown to be more effective than conventional means of enforcement); State v.
Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985) (approving properly conducted traffic safety
roadblock); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984) (upholding decision
to conduct roadblock as long as it is made by higher ranking administrative officers); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984)
(approving sobriety roadblock conducted in accordance with a written policy).
128 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 48-49, 493 A.2d at 1282-83.
129 Id. at 48, 493 A.2d at 1282.
130 Id.
131 See id.; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
132 See Kirk 202 N.J. Super. at 48-49, 493 A.2d at 1282-83.
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"subterfuge" for stopping vehicles at random. 133
In its discussion of relevant decisions from other states, the
Kirk court delineated several additional characteristics that might
increase the probability of judicial approval of sobriety roadblocks.'
Primarily, the court recognized the need to limit the
degree of subjective intrusion by law enforcement officers that
might result in concern or fright on the part of lawful travelers.' 35 The court noted that warning signs clearly identifying the
impending checkpoint would help to minimize this subjective intrusion. 13 6 Secondly, the court pointed out that advance warning
to the public that sobriety roadblocks will periodically be conducted also enhances the constitutionality of these limited
seizures. 1 7 The court opined that such advance notice is essential in promoting the deterrent aspect of sobriety checkpoints.' 38
Finally, the court noted that statistics reflecting the effectiveness
of the DWI roadblock as compared to less intrusive means of law
enforcement are highly desirable.' 39
Completing its analysis, the Kirk court held that the state
bears the burden of establishing the "overall reasonableness and
40
validity" of a search and seizure conducted without a warrant.
The court further noted that in this instance, the state had failed
to meet this burden; 14 1 therefore, the court condemned the Kirk
roadblock as an unreasonable seizure under article I, paragraph 7
of the New Jersey Constitution. 142 The court once again admonished that to justify a roadblock as reasonable, the state must
show that it substantially benefited the public and that it was not
operated wholly at the discretion of officers in the field.' 43
Although the court recognized that the carnage caused by
133 Id., 493 A.2d at 1282.
134 See id. at 49-54, 493 A.2d at 1283-86.
'35 See id. at 52, 493 A.2d at 1284; see also Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068, 1079
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (record disclosed no evidence relating to inconvenience
imposed on motorists).
136 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 46, 493 A.2d at 1281; see also State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 541, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983) ("advance warning to the individual
approaching motorist" is a factor enhancing a roadblock's constitutionality).
137 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 52, 493 A.2d at 1284; see Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d
1068, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
138 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 58, 493 A.2d at 1288.
139 See id. at 50, 493 A.2d at 1283.
140 Id. at 55, 493 A.2d at 1287; see State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133, 459 A.2d
1149, 1152 (1983).
141 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 55-56, 493 A.2d at 1287.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 55, 493 A.2d at 1286.
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drunken drivers is great,' 4 4 it did not believe this problem justi145
fied a complete disregard for the privacy rights of motorists.
The court stated that while police do not need to show probable
cause in order to stop a particular driver, "they must show some
rational basis for deploying this type of intrusive law enforcement technique."' 4 6
While the appellate division condemned the Kirk roadblock
as violating the mandates of the New Jersey Constitution, the
Kirk decision expressly authorizes the use of sobriety checkpoints
as part of the campaign to deter and apprehend intoxicated drivers. 147 Nevertheless, despite social and judicial advocacy of more
effective techniques of law enforcement,148 the use of DWI checkpoints remains controversial. 14' The controversy regarding the
use of these checkpoints emanates from the difficulties courts
have experienced in striking a balance between the use of an intrusive but necessary law enforcement technique and an individual's constitutional right to privacy. 150 Many opponents of the
DWI roadblocks have argued that this method of law enforcement is entirely arbitrary, unreasonable, and hence unconstitu144 See id. at 56-58, 493 A.2d at 1287-88. In recent years, the judiciary has displayed a heightened concern for the problem of drunken driving. See, e.g., South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (refusal to submit to blood test deemed
admissible as evidence); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (social host liability for intoxicated guest's automobile accident); In re Kallen, 92 N.J.
14, 455 A.2d 460 (1983) (refusal to take breathalyzer test results in suspension of
license); Division of Motor Vehicles v. Kleinert, 198 N.J. Super. 363, 486 A.2d 1324
(App. Div. 1985) (upholding suspension of New Jersey resident's license where
resident was convicted of DWI in Vermont); In re Kovalsky, 195 N.J. Super. 91, 477
A.2d 1295 (App. Div. 1984) (upholding suspension of NewJersey resident's license
where resident forfeited bail in Georgia on similar motor vehicle charge); Division
of Motor Vehicles v. Lawrence, 194 N.J. Super. 1, 475 A.2d 1265 (App. Div. 1983)
(New York conviction for driving while impaired resulted in suspension of New
Jersey license); see also State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 588, 458 A.2d 502, 510 (1983)
(drunken drivers are a "menace to society").
145 Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 56, 58, 493 A.2d at 1287, 1288.
146 Id. at 56, 493 A.2d at 1287.
147 See id. at 56-58, 493 A.2d at 1287-88.
148 See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 8, 663 P.2d 992, 999
(1983) (Feldman, J., specially concurring). Justice Feldman noted that "it [is] obvious that traditional law enforcement methods, involving the arrest by roving officers of only those whom they can stop upon a founded suspicion of drunk driving,
fall short of satisfying society's compelling interest in enforcing compliance with
the laws prohibiting drunk driving." Id. (footnote omitted).
149 See Note, supra note 8 at 1460. The author notes that "although some jurisdictions have accepted the use of some types of roadblocks, the constitutionality of
roadblock stops for DWI enforcement remains unclear." Id.
150 See id. at 1464.
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tional.' 5 1 It is routinely recognized, however, that arbitrarily
conducted building inspections to enforce housing safety codes
promote a state interest sufficient to justify this intrusion into
one's privacy. 152 Likewise, luggage checks and metal detection
procedures at airports are interferences with personal liberties. 5 M Nonetheless, all persons are subjected to these types of
searches, even though there is no founded suspicion that they are
engaged in criminal activity.1 54 In these situations, the intrusion
into an individual's privacy has been rationalized because there is
an urgent need for inspection, the potential for damage is great,
55
and there are few, if any, alternatives.
The governmental interest in apprehending and deterring
drunken drivers appears at least as important as the interests
promoted by building inspections and airport stops and seizures.
Indeed, the privacy intrusion occasioned at a DWI roadblock is
no more pervasive. In fact, an individual's expectation of privacy
in his automobile is usually considered to be less than similar expectations in his home or other constitutionally safeguarded areas. 15 6 Nevertheless, roadblock opponents continue to assert that
the governmental interest promoted by the employment of DWI
checkpoints is insufficient to justify the fourth amendment intrusion.'57 These assertions are unpersuasive. As the Kirk opinion
and empirical data illustrate, the drunk driving problem urgently
needs resolution. 158 The potential for damage caused by the intoxicated driver is statistically self-evident.' 5 9 In addition, aside
from roadblocks, the methods available to the government for
151 See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d 992, 997
(1983) (Feldman, J., specially concurring); West, supra note 84, at 8, col. 1.
152 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967).
153 See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 9, 663 P.2d 992, 1000

(1983) (Feldman, J., specially concurring).
154 See id.
155 See id.

156 See People v. Peil, 122 Misc. 2d 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532 J. Ct. 1984). The Peil
court stated that "the highly mobile and visible nature of automobiles has traditionally resulted in an individual's 'lesser expectation of privacy' while driving an automobile than in one's home or other constitutionally protected areas." Id. at 620,
471 N.Y.S.2d at 534 (citations omitted).
157 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 56-58, 493 A.2d at 1287-88.
159 See Comment, Filling in the Blanks after Prouse: A New Standardfor the DrinkingDriving Roadblock, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 241, 250 (1985); see also The War Against

Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34, 37 (drunk drivers contribute to
over half of the nation's fatal motor vehicle accidents).
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deterring and apprehending the drunken driver are few. 160 The
foremost alternative is still the seizure of a single driver by a roving police patrol responding either to observable equipment or
safety violations or to articulable facts manifested by erratic
driver behavior. 16 The adequacy of this method of enforcement
is questionable. A recent study by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration indicates that on a national basis, the
probability of an intoxicated driver being stopped under traditional detection methods is between 1 in 500 and 1 in 2000.162
Clearly, such ineffective enforcement of the drunk driving laws
would do little to deter the intoxicated driver from operating
an
163
automobile and thereby endangering the lives of others.
The Kirk opinion correctly emphasized the necessity of the
sobriety roadblock as a law enforcement technique because of its
potential deterrent effect."6 Persons faced with the chance of encountering a sobriety roadblock are more likely to reduce their
1 65
liquor consumption in situations where they will be driving.
The Kirk opinion notes, however, that this deterrent effect will
operate only where drinking motorists have advance warning that
they might encounter a roadblock.' 66 While it is not suggested
that police should announce the precise time and location of
each roadblock, some advance publicity of the intention to initiate this law enforcement technique should be given. In this way,
the government will best serve its ultimate goal of deterring people from driving while intoxicated.
In general, most courts have found the state interest in keeping drunken drivers off the road sufficient to justify the use of
properly conducted roadblock operations. 67 The Kirk court indicated, however, that courts will only condone this type of law enforcement technique if it makes a necessary contribution to
furthering a valid state interest. 168 Indeed, DWI roadblocks make
160 State ex rel. Ekstrom v.Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 8, 663 P.2d 992, 999 (1983)
(Feldman, J., specially concurring).
161 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. The Court noted that "[t]he foremost method of
enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations. . .is acting upon observed violations." Id.
162 GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 2.
163 See Comment, supra note 159, at 251 (stating that "one-third of drinking drivers [believe] that the chances of being caught and punished are too small to deter
them from driving while drunk").
164 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 43, 493 A.2d at 1279 (citation omitted).
165 State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
166 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 43, 58, 493 A.2d at 1279, 1288.
167 See supra notes 80 & 127.
168 See Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 55, 493 A.2d at 1286.
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a necessary contribution to a systematic plan of drunk driving deterrence. Without the use of DWI roadblocks, police cannot detect many intoxicated drivers because these drivers fail to exhibit
the visible signs of intoxication necessary to justify a roving patrol stop.' 69 When properly conducted, roadblocks best achieve
the dual state interests of deterring and apprehending
drunken
70
manner.
unintrusive
relatively
drivers in a
DWI roadblocks will not achieve their underlying purposes,
however, if they are located in areas that are not frequented by
drunken drivers. 17 A DWI checkpoint should be supported by

data showing a noticeable incidence of alcohol-related accidents
at the particular site chosen. 72 This evidence serves both to legitimize the state's interest in establishing the roadblock and to
support the constitutionality of the roadblock itself. 17 The absence of such an empirical basis for conducting a DWI roadblock
may obviate the alleged state interest in establishing the particu74
lar roadblock as a means of combating DWI.
In view of the injuries and deaths caused each year by
drunken drivers,175 the governmental interest in deterring and
apprehending intoxicated motorists clearly outweighs the minor
privacy intrusion occasioned at sobriety roadblocks. Until the
United States Supreme Court expressly sanctions the use of sobriety checkpoints, however, it is critical that jurisdictions contemplating such stops adopt and follow specific procedures
designed to minimize the intrusion into the privacy of motorists.
This can best be accomplished by the supervisory creation of predetermined, written policies designed to minimize police discretion at checkpoint operations. If appropriate guidelines are
followed, sobriety roadblocks will continue to function as a legitimate and effective means of combating the persistent problem of
drunken driving.
Mark A. Lustbader
169 See Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at 580, 427 A.2d at 133 (intoxicated motorist did
not exhibit erratic driving prior to seizure at sobriety checkpoint).
170 See Comment, supra note 159, at 251-52.
171 See Note, supra note 8, at 1472.
172 See Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at 582, 427 A.2d at 134 (discussing importance of
empirical data for justifying roadblock).
173 See id.
174 See Note, supra note 8, at 1472.
175 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.

